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1
Introduction – The “Holy”: A Brief Overview
“‘Holiness’ – ‘the holy’ – is a category of interpretation and valuation peculiar to the
sphere of religion.”1 This “peculiarity to the sphere of religion” emerges out of the German
“religious philosopher”2 Rudolf Otto’s most renowned book, The Idea of the Holy. Which is the
primary source for this work as a whole.
It will be helpful to have a sense of what the holy is before diving deeper into its
complexities. In Otto’s definition, the holy serves as something between a deity and the sublime.
The complexity of the holy resides, in part, in its dichotomy: “the holy in the fullest sense of the
word is a combined, complex category, the combining elements being its rational and nonrational components.”3 The holy is simultaneously rational and non-rational. The holy is not a
deity because deity potentially implies a plurality and is also associated with idolatry. The holy is
singular and the non-rational aspect of the holy does not accept a physical presence as in
idolatry. The holy is also not the same as the sublime because the sublime is completely other.
The rational side of the holy contradicts this. Although partly something other, the holy has
intellectually graspable attributes. So, think of the holy loosely as a divine presence, but let your
mind be open to new interpretations of what a divine presence can mean, and that will approach
Otto’s meaning.
Alongside this open-ended idea of a divine presence, Otto’s books The Philosophy of
Religion: Based on Kant and Fries and Naturalism and Religion will help guide our reading of
the holy. They are not meant to distract from our focus, but, rather, to help us better inform the

1

Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-rational Factor in the Idea of the
Divine and Its Relation to the Rational, trans. John W. Harvey (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1958), 5.
2
Otto, The Idea of the Holy, xi.
3
Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 112.
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idea of the holy. These two works precede the primary source and are the basis for Otto’s idea of
the holy. In the forward to The Idea of the Holy, Otto expresses the importance of these two
works to his ideas.
Before I venture upon this field of inquiry I spent many years of study upon the
rational aspect of that supreme Reality we call ‘God’, and the results of my work
are contained in my books, Naturalistische und religiöse Weltansicht [Naturalism
and Religion] and Die Kant-Friesische Religions-Philosophie [The Philosophy of
Religion: Based on Kant and Fries]. And I feel that no one ought to concern
himself with the ‘Numen ineffible’ who has not already devoted assiduous and
serious study to the ‘Ratio aeterna’ [eternal Reason].4
We must be familiar with both works before attempting to understand the holy. The Philosophy
of Religion is an elaboration on how Fries’s idea of the sublime heals the criticisms against
Kant’s idea of pure and practical reason. It is useful in our discussion of Otto’s holy to look at
how Otto connects with Fries and Kant because The Idea of the Holy parallels the Fries and Kant
pairing. The only difference is that Otto’s holy replaces Fries’s Ahnung.
Ahnung is defined in the translator’s notes at the beginning of The Philosophy of
Religion:
Fries understands by Ahnung (Ahnudung) a conviction, originating in the
feelings, without any definite conception, of the reality of the supra-sensual,
which gives us a reflection of the real existence of things in their phenomena, and
brings us to their external meaning and purposeful connection, in Nature’s
sublimity and beauty
This is belief based on feelings. A reality based on feelings as opposed to the rational. Otto’s
holy and Fries’s sublime have this non-rational aspect in common. This idea of Fries’s will be
referred to later on in this introduction.
Naturalism and Religion, on the other hand, is a book that wrestles with the relationship
between naturalism and religion. At the same time that Otto is trying to establish that the two
have a relationship, he is also presenting naturalism’s problematic reductionist tendency, which
4

Otto, The Idea of the Holy, Forward.
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leaves no room for religion. It is important to understand this, and will become even more so
later on, because it situates and embellishes the ego. This work is not constructive to this
introduction; however, it will be of use later on.
Otto begins The Idea of the Holy speaking to the rational side of the holy: “An object that
can thus be thought conceptually may be termed rational.”5 This may seem like a very broad
definition of rational, but it becomes critical to the understanding of the holy. The object that can
be thought of conceptually within Otto’s rational aspect of the holy is the divine presence.6
It is essential to every theistic conception of God, and most of all the Christian,
that it distinguishes and precisely characterizes deity by the attributes spirit,
reason, purpose, good will, supreme power, unity, [and] selfhood.7
All of these attributes can be “grasped by the intellect.”8 The divine presence, in this case deity,
has attributes that can be conceptualized. “The nature of deity described in the attributes above
mentioned is, then a rational nature; and a religion which recognizes and maintains such a view
of God is in so far a ‘rational’ religion.”9 A religion whose divine presence encompasses these
graspable attributes is considered “rational.” Otto makes it clear that every religion must meet
this requirement within his approach. “Only on such terms is belief possible in contrast to mere
feeling.”10 The attributes designated to the divine presence are crucial for Otto. They make a
religion “rational” and therefore enable belief.

5

Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 1.
Otto uses the term deity here, but nowhere else in his work does he use holy in the same light as
deity. I will consistently use “divine presence” throughout this work no matter what term Otto
uses. Otto’s relational words will continue to change throughout.
7
Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 1.
8
Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 1.
9
Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 1.
10
Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 1.
6
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However, the holy is not simply the rational, for “we have to be on our guard against
error which would lead to a wrong and one-sided interpretation of religion.”11 A one-sided view
is one where “the essence of [the] deity can be given completely and exhaustively in such
‘rational’ attributions”12 A divine presence whose essence is mistaken as its “rational” attributes
is one-sided.
This one-sided critique speaks directly to the thinkers of the 19th century. The Idea of the
Holy was published in German in 1917 and later published in English in 1923.13 Otto was
entering the theological conversation at a time when the rational aspect of religion was heavily
privileged. Although Ivan Strenski’s entry about Otto in his book Understanding Theories of
Religion classifies Otto as a phenomenologist, I feel that he does a very good job informing the
readers about whom Otto was beyond that designation. For this reason, I will use Strenski’s
situation of Otto in history:
[Otto] was deeply involved in overturning prevailing nineteenth-century liberal
Protestant conceptions of religion, such as Robertson Smith’s – namely that
religion was really morality. But Robertson Smith was not alone among our
classic theorists in making this identification of religion and morality. Weber,
Freud, and Durkheim too held this position at one time or another. Otto, however,
felt this rather “domesticated” religion by making it altogether too social and
rational. Put otherwise, the identification of religion with morality reduced
religion to something other than it was.14
The same problem Otto has with the rational idea of the 19th-century is the problem I briefly
mentioned in introducing Naturalism and Religion, namely, the problem of reducing. Reducing
leads to a one-sided view of something. In this case, Otto sees 19th century thinkers to be
reducing religion to rationale. Otto is not saying that these thinkers are completely wrong; after
11

Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 1.
Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 1-2.
13
Bernard E. Meland, "Rudolf Otto," in Encyclopedia Britannica Online, last modified
December 19, 2014, accessed April 27, 2016, http://www.britannica.com/biography/Rudolf-Otto
14
Ivan Strenski, Understanding Theories of Religion: An Introduction, 2nd ed. (Chichester, West
Sussex: Wiley Blackwell, 2015), 86, digital file.
12
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all, he incorporates the rational into his idea of the holy. However, the rational attributes only
make up an aspect of the divine presence. He is saying that the ideas are incomplete.
Otto proposes a dichotomy as a solution to the reduction of one-sidedness. We get a
better sense what this means when he says, “For so far are these ‘rational’ attributes from
exhausting the idea of deity, that they in fact imply a non-rational supra-natural subject of which
they are predicates.”15 For him, there is a distinction between attributes and essence. He argues
that the essence of the divine presence is not rational, only the attributes, which are a distinction
of the essence, are rational. Further, the “rational” attributes are so miniscule in relation to the
idea of a divine presence that they cannot possibly be all the divine presence is comprised of.
“Rational” attributes simply predicate the non-rational subject of the divine presence.
So, what is the non-rational aspect of the holy and how does it exist in relation to the
rational in order make up the whole? “It will be our endeavor to suggest this unnamed Something
to the reader as far as we may, so that he may himself feel it.”16 At the onset, the non-rational is
presented as a “Something” that is felt and unnamed. This Something is “‘the holy’ minus its
moral factor or ‘moment,’ and … minus its ‘rational’ aspect altogether.”17 This non-rational
Something is later explained as religious feelings that Otto names “mysterium tremendum” and
“creature consciousness.” These feelings regard the interaction with what Otto calls the numen.
Otto renames the non-rational aspect of the holy numen in order to accurately talk about
the non-rational in isolation. The word “holy,” within the Bible, is translated from “the Hebrew
qadôsh, to which the Greek äyios and the Latin sanctus.”18 The problem Otto has with these
translations is that “all three languages connote, as part of their meaning, good, absolute
15

Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 2.
Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 6.
17
Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 6.
18
Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 6.
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goodness.”19 This is a problem because Otto sees this isolated, non-rational aspect of the “holy
above and beyond the meaning of goodness.”20 Otto adopts the Latin word “numen” to mean the
divine presence and expands upon the word to make numinous. “This [numinous] mental state is
perfectly sui generis [unique] and irreducible to any other; and therefore, like every absolutely
primary and elementary datum, while it admits of being discussed, it cannot be strictly
defined.”21 The numen is the divine presence and the numinous is the mental state evoked by the
numen. The numinous is the experience of the numen.
Otto goes into great detail about religious feeling and the numen and numinous, however
that detail will be explored in chapter 1. For now, what is useful to us is that the non-rational
exists as something minus the rational element of the holy. It is this idea that establishes Otto’s
lasting impact on the conversation regarding the approach to theorizing religion. Although he
was not the first to speak of religious experience, he was the first to establish an approach to
theorizing religion that included an experiential aspect totally outside of the rational. Where
others included experience their rational ideas, Otto included the rational in his experiential idea.
Having identified the aspects of Otto’s dichotomy, rational and non-rational, we must
now come to an understanding of how it functions. It is useful to first look at Otto’s book The
Philosophy of Religion: Based on Kant and Fries. In The Philosophy of Religion, Otto shows
“the fundamental importance of certain elements of the philosopher Fries, derived from Kant and
given a new orientation, with regard to the possibility of a new Philosophy of Religion.” 22 The

19

Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 6.
Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 6.
21
Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 7.
22
Rudolf Otto, The Philosophy of Religion: Based on Kant and Fries, trans. E. B. Dicker
(London: Williams and Norgate, 1931), 9.
20
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most relevant elements of Kant and Fries for understanding Otto’s holy are Kant’s idea of pure
reason and his idea of critique of judgment, and Fries’s Ahnung.
In both The Philosophy of Religion and The Idea of the Holy, the underlying question
Otto is aiming to answer is: what is the ontological proof of a divine presence? Also in both, the
question is answered in the exact same manner: through the idea of a priori knowledge. Again
the difference between the two books is Fries’s sublime and Otto’s holy. Because Otto elaborates
upon a priori further in The Philosophy of Religion, I will turn to it for clarification about a
priori.
In regard to the holy, the rational and non-rational unite as “a purely a priori category.”23
The question that arises now is: What does Otto mean by a priori? Because Otto assumes the
reader to be familiar with his previous works, he does not describe the a priori at length within
The Idea of the Holy. In chapter 2, section 2, of The Philosophy of Religion, “Religious Truth as
Necessary Truth,” Otto explains the a priori.
This quote begins just after Otto introduces the reader to Fries’s ideas in a continuous
series of quotes. Otto presents two conceptions of religion and ethics, historico-empiric truth and
necessary truth.
The contrast between historico-empiric truth and necessary truth is obviously in
total agreement with the contrast between mere being-taught and finding-out-foroneself (being inwardly convinced). That in religion everything depends on the
latter is really self-evident to this way of thinking. – From Descartes to Spinoza,
Leibnitz, Lessing, this conviction always breaks through. But, to speak generally,
it is a part of that extremely consistent and coherent basis of a general conception
which, in spite of the variety in its schools of thought, gives the “Aufklärung” its
unity. And in fact it is the sense of the fruitless but ever-renewed efforts of that
age towards an “ontological proof of God,” i.e. an individual ascertainment of
God without an “empiric taint,” purely a priori and solely from the means at the
disposal of the reasoning mind itself. Behind this as a driving force there is the

23
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just sentiment that the loftiest ideas of the reasoning mind and this truth cannot
and must not in the last resort be founded on anything external and “accidental.”24
Otto speaks to historico-empiric truth as assuming necessary truth. This is an entry point to Fries
because his “Aufklärung” grounds the idea of religion as a necessary truth. It is here where we
come to terms with a priori. We come to understand a priori in contrast to the empirical:
knowledge versus experience. The a priori enables one to “find-out-for-oneself,” where
historical experience is taught. Although they are being contrasted, it does not mean that one is
irrelevant. The argument is that religious truth, which is necessary truth, cannot be established
from experience. Others cannot teach us.
Otto is able to start here because he is working off the ideas of other thinkers: “And in
fact it is the sense of the fruitless but ever-renewed efforts of that age towards an ‘ontological
proof of God’”25 The thinkers Otto named, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, and Lessing, are ones
who pushed us toward the idea that there is existing proof of God. They have pushed us there,
but they assume religion as a necessary truth. Otto is arguing that they have pushed us there but
not proven the proof to be true.
This is where Otto’s holy and Fries’s Ahnung come in. Otto uses a priori as the
ontological proof of God. The ontological proof of God lies in the a priori, an accessible
knowledge we can all obtain. For Fries, the intuitive knowledge we obtain is Ahnung, the feeling
of the sublime. But for Otto, the a priori is the holy. We all obtain the knowledge of the rational
and non-rational aspects of the holy. We know the attributes of the deity and we know the numen
and the numinous.

24
25

Otto, The Philosophy of Religion, 34.
Otto, The Philosophy of Religion, 34.
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Even though we all have a priori knowledge, that doesn’t mean that knowledge is readily
available to us. This is why Otto shies away from using the term “innate.” Before elaborating
upon the numen in The Idea of the Holy, Otto proclaims:
The reader is invited to direct his mind to a moment of deeply-felt religious
experience, as little as possible qualified by other forms of consciousness.
Whoever cannot do this, whoever knows no such moments in his experience, is
requested to read no farther.26
Otto is admitting that a priori knowledge is not readily available. That some may not have
realized the a priori knowledge of the holy yet. Read literally, this quote seems rather harsh and
is contradictory to Otto’s whole idea of the holy. Otto is trying to convince us that we all have a
priori knowledge of the holy, but read literally, he only wants to explain it to those who have
already realized this knowledge. This reading makes an all-inclusive idea seemingly exclusive.
I want to challenge the literal reading of this quote. We have already established that
some have yet to experience the holy. I suggest we read this quote as if it were a kind of
advertising. Otto is telling those who have not yet experienced the holy to put the book down in
an effort to make them more curious about what it is they are missing. After all, the majority of
The Idea of the Holy is an elaboration and argument for the non-rational side of the holy, the side
that evokes a unique mental state within us.
What do I mean by us? Who are we within Otto’s idea of the holy? Are we human? As
we will come to find out in chapter 1, when I elaborate upon the non-rational creature
consciousness feeling, Otto refers to humans as creatures. Chapter 2 will expand on this idea and
speak to what the creature is made up of: “the creature – soul and spirit.”27

26
27

Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 8.
Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 194.
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One distinctive aspect of Otto’s idea of the holy in relation to the creature is individuality.
The historico-empiric truth, which Otto earlier contrasted with the a priori in The Philosophy of
Religion, reveals its importance here.
There is only one way to help another to an understanding of it [the numen]. He
must be guided and led on by consideration and discussion of the matter through
the ways of his own mind, until he reaches the point at which ‘the numinous’ in
him perforce begins to stir.28
The holy is a priori, it is founded on the knowledge imbedded within us from the start; however,
our experiences do help guide us. Ultimately, we are the only ones who can evoke the a priori
knowledge of the holy within ourselves. Fries and Otto differ here. Fries’s Ahnung can be shared,
Otto’s holy cannot. For Otto, the awakening process is subjective, dependent upon an individual
creature though the holy is objective. Otto’s idea of subjectivity and individuality will be
addressed in chapter 2.
From what we have discussed, we know that Otto’s holy is a divine presence creatures
have a priori knowledge of. Though this knowledge is embedded within us, it is not readily
available. This is where Otto’s dichotomy comes into play. The non-rational aspect of the holy,
the numen/numinous, is an awakening to the a priori knowledge of the holy. We come to the
awakening of the non-rational in the ways of our own minds. Others simply help guide us. The
feeling of the holy that arises within the mind is instantly made sense of because of its a priori
existence. Preceding this feeling/awakening is the a priori knowledge of the rational. The
rational attributes of the divine presence, which enable belief and deem a religion “rational,”
make up the rational side of the holy. Upon realizing the feeling of the holy, our mind becomes
aware of the attributes of the divine presence and is able to make sense of our belief. Otto’s holy

28
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exists as the explanation of the ontological proof of God so many thinkers before Otto pushed
toward.
While expanding on the ideas introduced here, the remaining chapters will present and
problematize different dichotomies that exist within the idea of the holy. The dichotomies I am
choosing to present are rational and non-rational, the main dichotomy of the holy, soul and spirit,
which make up the dichotomy of the self, and lastly, body and mind, the dichotomy regarding
the localization of the self. Although Otto’s work is not limited to these three dichotomies, I feel
that they are the most crucial to treat. The problems relating to each dichotomy will be argued
through inconsistencies in Otto’s ideas. More specifically, I will argue for a redefinition of a
priori to exclude the rational, argue that the creature’s individuality belongs to the spirit, and that
the self be localized in the body.
Before beginning, it is important to note why I have chosen to center my work on Otto
and his Idea of the Holy. I feel that Otto has become a footnote in modern academia. He is
written about as though he is not important enough to elaborate upon, yet is important enough to
mention. When he is treated as more than a footnote, the mistreatment still occurs. His ideas are
picked up and proven flawed. It is as if scholars are patting him on the back saying, “This is
interesting but doesn’t really work.”
An example is Professor of Jewish Theology Melissa Raphael’s “Constructivism and
Numinous Experience.” Raphael’s piece argues Otto’s holy as “a phenomenological analysis of
(male) reactions to an unconceptualized numinous object.”29 In arguing that Otto’s approach to
theorizing religion is gendered, her conclusion becomes “that the numinous experience is

29
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unlikely to be (and still less to remain) the comprehensive core of both men and women.” 30 She
is leaving Otto in shambles.31
Scholars who take up Otto are absolutely right that his ideas are flawed. In fact, Raphael
raises legitimate issues with Otto, but I believe she hasn’t given Otto enough attention. My
approach is different from those who mistreat him because I believe Otto’s problems can be
treated. I do not see Otto as the problem. I view Otto’s problem, which is outside the scope of
this project, as a perpetuation of what Eve Browning Cole names the gender binary.
In conclusion, I hope that by paying due attention to Otto’s work that I bring an
awareness and further appreciation to his idea. I hope Otto and his idea of the holy become
treated more than a footnote.

30

Raphael, "Feminism, Constructivism and Numinous," 526.
I am aware that Raphael went on to write a book about Otto’s significance years after this
piece, however, I’m speaking to this article in order to exemplify how many scholars treat him.
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Chapter 1 – The Awakening: Redefining Otto’s a priori
Having come to an understanding of the holy in the introduction, we will now turn to the
first dichotomy, rational and non-rational. The elements of the non-rational that were not fully
explored last chapter will be explained. Those elements deal with religious feeling and are
defined by Otto as “creature consciousness” and mysterium tremendum. After explaining Otto’s
definition of both, I will argue that the mysterium tremendum represents an awakening. If we
view mysterium tremendum as an awakening, another argument emerges: that Otto’s rational
aspect of the holy should not be considered a priori. Arguing the rational outside of a priori is
ultimately an argument against Otto’s definition of a priori.
The first religious feeling of the non-rational part of Otto’s holy I will address is creature
consciousness. We will come to know it as a religious feeling of nothingness evoked by a divine
presence. Because Otto uses German theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher’s “feeling of
dependence,” which, until defined later, can be thought of as a dependence upon God, as a base
for his definition of creature consciousness, Schleiermacher’s ideas must first be understood.
Schleiermacher appears in Otto’s Philosophy of Religion. Although that book is about
Kant and Fries, Schleiermacher is introduced alongside Fries and continues to make appearances
throughout the book. From Otto’s treatment of Schleiermacher in The Philosophy of Religion, we
can better understand how Otto is using Schleiermacher’s idea.
On the first page of the introduction in The Philosophy of Religion, Otto takes up and
clarifies how he views Fries and Schleiermacher’s relationship.
Historians of the philosophy of religion have pointed out a certain affinity
between Fries and Schleiermacher in their treatment of the theory of religious
“feeling,” but they have assumed that Schleiermacher’s was the more original and
comprehensive intellect. Really, however, in the philosophy of religion, the points
of contact between Fries and Schleiermacher are less important than their points

14
of difference; and where their views agree, Fries is quite original and closer study
proves him to be superior in comprehensiveness, thoroughness and solidity.32
Otto acknowledges that both Fries and Schleiermacher present similar philosophies of religion.
Throughout The Philosophy of Religion, Naturalism and Religion, and The Idea of the Holy Otto
uncovers and makes use of Fries and Schleiermacher’s differences. However, the way Otto treats
these differences often confuses their importance.
In The Philosophy of Religion, as exemplified in the block quote above, Otto claims
Schleiermacher’s ideas are superior to Fries’s. He even goes on to call Schleiermacher’s feeling
of dependence “a very one-sided and inadequate description of religious feeling, which in Fries
has found a much more varied and precise development.”33 Although Otto claims Fries is
superior in “comprehensiveness, thoroughness and solidity” and views Schleiermacher’s feeling
of dependence as one sided, there is a footnote that states, “I have dealt with the relation of Fries
and Schleiermacher in my Naturalistische and religiöse Weltansicht [Naturalism and Religion],
but I am now compelled to withdraw my remarks as to Schleiermacher’s superiority to Fries.”
Otto shows Schleiermacher’s weaknesses but admits he has strengths. This makes it seem like
Otto is choosing Fries. That Otto is withdrawing his comments because they were wrong. In
reading all three works, it is clear that this is not the case.
The Philosophy of Religion and Naturalism and Religion talk about different things.
Where Naturalism and Religion deals with naturalism’s reductionist tendency and contributes to
the idea of the holy in establishing the self. As will be addressed in chapter 2. The Philosophy of
Religion aims to distinguish a relationship between Fries and Kant, which contributes to Otto’s
definition of a priori. Otto uses Scheiermacher’s feeling of dependence to help clarify the self
32
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and Fries’s Ahnung to help explain a priori. Otto withdraws his remarks from Naturalism and
Religion within The Philosophy of Religion because of the differing contexts.
Without reading the other texts, we can still understand that Otto isn’t totally discrediting
Schleiermacher in The Philosophy of Religion. Just after Otto highlights Schleiermacher’s flaws,
he tells us to “consider Fries as being outside the ‘philosophy of feeling.’”34 Otto is saying that
Fries does not speak to religious feelings. At the same time Otto withdraws his remarks about
Schleiermacher’s superiority, he is also highlighting Schleiermacher’s advantage. If Fries is
“outside the philosophy of feeling,” Otto implies Schleiermacher is within it. Otto is pointing to
a difference between Schleiermacher and Fries. What is important about Schleiermacher is his
feeling of dependence. Fries is superior in The Philosophy of Religion because the feeling of
dependence is not germane to that work. Otto is using different parts of each thinker’s ideas to
address different parts of his own. The language of superiority is misleading and only speaks to
the particular book in which it resides.
Otto using parts of Fries and Schleiermacher’s ideas means, as he says, there are parts,
which he does not agree with. Since Otto uses Schleiermacher’s feeling of dependence to inform
creature consciousness, Otto’s religious feeling, we must understand what is it about
Schleiermacher’s thinking that Otto finds wanting. In The Idea of the Holy, Otto raises two main
issues with Schleiermacher’s feeling of dependence. The first problem is one sidedness.
In the first place, the feeling or emotion he [Schleiermacher] has in mind in this
phrase [feeling of dependence] is in its specific quality not a “feeling of
dependence” in the “natural” sense of the word. As such, other domains of life
and other regions of experience than the religious occasion the feeling, as a sense
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of personal insufficiency and impotence, a consciousness of being determined by
circumstances and environment.35
Otto sees Schleiermacher’s feeling of dependence as one sided because it is missing context.
Who is the feeling happening to? When/where does it arise? What specifically is Schleiermacher
talking about? It’s like someone saying they are hungry and then failing to elaborate further.
When someone tells someone else they are hungry the immediate question is, “What do you
want?” There is a lot of frustration in not receiving an answer because we know there is often a
craving, which coincides. We know there is more to their feeling. In this analogy, Otto would say
the hunger is not complete. We are only speaking to an aspect of our feeling when we fail to
elaborate.
Otto goes on to say, “What he [Schleiermacher] overlooks is that, in giving the feeling
the name ‘feeling of dependence’ at all, we are really employing what is no more than a very
close analogy.”36 If we refer back my analogy of hunger, the word hunger does not describe the
feeling that takes place. Hunger manifests in ways such as stomach churning and mouth
watering. Hunger is merely a word for the feeling that occurs, it is not the feeling itself.
Schleiermacher’s idea becomes an analogy for creature consciousness.
If Otto is saying Schleiermacher’s feeling of dependence does not fit into the natural
sense of the word, what is the natural sense of “feeling.” Although, in colloquial language feeling
assumes sensory perception, when Otto speaks to feelings, he isn’t talking about the senses. Otto
is referring to feelings that arise in the mind: “these feelings [religious feelings] can only arise in
the mind as accompanying emotions when the category of ‘the numinous’ is called into play.” 37
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The numinous is the divine presence. Not only are feelings of the mind, they are enabled by a
divine presence. Otto saying Schleiermacher’s feeling of dependence is not a feeling “in the
natural sense of the word” points to Otto’s second critique of Schleiermacher.
Before elaborating upon the second issue of Schleiermacher’s “feeling of dependence”,
let us introduce creature consciousness: “It is the emotion of a creature, submerged and
overwhelmed by its own nothingness in contrast to that which is supreme above all creatures.”38
We, the creatures, experience religious feeling in the presence of “that which is supreme above
all creatures,” or the numen. As a reminder, the numen is the divine presence and the numinous is
the mental state evoked by the numen. This definition of creature consciousness reinforces the
inadequacy of Schleiermacher’s “feeling of dependence.” It’s like saying, “the feeling of a
human, painstakingly consumed by its own stomach churning bodily need for nourishment.”
Hunger is inadequate, so too is feeling of dependence.
This leads into the second problem Otto raises with Schleiermacher’s “feeling of
dependence,” the issue of how the feeling arises.
The religious emotion, is merely a category of self-valuation, in the sense of selfdeprecation. According to him [Schleiermacher] the religious emotion would be
directly and primarily a sort of self-consciousness, a feeling concerning oneself in
a special, determined relation, viz. one’s dependence. Thus, according to
Schleiermacher, I can only come upon the very fact of God as a result of an
inference, that is by reasoning to a cause beyond myself to account for my
“feeling of dependence.”39
For Schleiermacher, the feeling of dependence is a state of mind we come to on our own. We
begin to question what we are missing after we realize we are dependent. The way religious
feeling arises, then, is out of deductive reasoning. Once we realize we are dependent, it must be
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deduced that there is a something we are dependent upon. God becomes a solution to the
problem of dependence.
Otto’s creature consciousness is more complex. There is a separation between religious
feeling and the divine presence. God is not a solution but a presence, which evokes a feeling.
The “creature-feeling” is itself a first subjective concomitant and effect of another
feeling-element, which casts it like a shadow, but which in itself indubitably has
immediate and primary reference to an object outside the self. Now this object is
just what we have already spoken of as “the numinous.”40
Creature consciousness exists only in the presence of the numen. The difference between Otto
and Schleiermacher here is where the dependence arises. For Schleiermacher, the feeling of
dependence arises from within us. We infer that we are dependent and, therefore, reason God
exists. In Otto, the numen is used to enable creature consciousness. The feeling arises out of an
experience with the numen. For Otto, the divine presence enables the feeling. It is not one we can
create. The example of encountering a ghost will be used later on, however, it is also helpful
here. When we encounter a ghost, or believe we encounter something otherworldly, it evokes a
really strong emotion. This emotion is one that cannot be deduced by our mind alone. Even if we
had an idea about what it would be like, we could not replicate the emotion by thinking about it.
We must encounter an otherworldly presence for the emotion to arise. Otto is arguing that
religious emotions are not deduced, but evoked and experienced.
We have addressed how Otto distinguishes his ideas from Schleiermacher’s, however it is
important to note that this relationship is controversial. Scholars Andrew Dole and A.D. Smith
have opposing opinions about it. Where Dole sees a difference between Otto and
Schleiermacher’s ideas, Smith does not. Dole’s “Schleiermacher and Otto on religion” argues,
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“there are important differences between Schleiermacher's and Otto's accounts of religion.”41
Smith’s piece, “Schleiermacher and Otto on Religion: a reappraisal,” which is a response to
Dole’s piece, argues, “that there is, in fact, nothing to distinguish between the two thinkers [Otto
and Schleiermacher] on these issues [those raised by Dole].”42 Ultimately, Smith does not
believe Otto and Dole give Schleiermacher enough credit and that Schleiermacher has been
misunderstood.
For the purpose of future arguments, I am siding with Dole and Otto. Although Smith
believes Otto and Dole do not give Schleiermacher enough credit, I argue that Otto isn’t using
Schleiermacher in order to prove the feeling of dependence wrong. Otto is expanding upon and
altering the feeling of dependence to create creature consciousness. For Otto, Schleiermacher is
pointing to the right feeling, but hasn’t quite established it. Founding a major idea of holy upon
the feeling of dependence is not undervaluing.
Smith’s argument about Otto and Dole misunderstanding Schleiermacher’s ideas does not
work out either. Dole writes another piece in response to Smith’s, which state,
My argument was that Otto himself saw Schleiermacher's understanding of
religion as dangerously “naturalistic” in a sense that opened religion to the charge
of being, roughly, an illusory human production rather than something grounded
in the experience of the transcendent. In his “Reappraisal” Smith passes in silence
over this material; he has subsequently dedicated an independent essay to
discussing some of Otto's criticisms.43
The illusory human production Dole speaks to is the same argument that emerged from Otto’s
second critique regarding how religious feeling arises. Dole pushes Otto’s argument further by
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deeming Schleiermacher’s understanding “naturalistic.” Otto makes an argument about
naturalism in his book Naturalism and Religion. Although this idea will be addressed in the
coming chapters, one of the main problems Otto has with naturalism is its reductionist tendency.
Dole applies this argument to Schleiermacher’s feeling of dependence to say that it is reducing
religious feeling. I am siding with Dole and Otto in regard to Schleiermacher because as Dole
says, Smith fails to address Schleiermacher’s lack of grounding in transcendental experience. I
see the transcendental experience of creature consciousness as Otto’s contribution to
Schleiermacher’s feeling of dependence.
To review, creature consciousness is the religious feeling, within the mind, of
nothingness, brought on in the presence of the numen. There is a problem here, though. We
established in the introduction that the knowledge of the holy, although a priori, is not readily
accessible. Although we have a priori knowledge of the numen, it does not mean we
automatically know what the numen is. There has to be a moment when we come to realize the a
priori knowledge: as Otto would say, an awakening. The creature consciousness assumes that we
have been awoken.
Otto introduces another religious feeling, mysterium tremendum. Although he does not
call mysterium tremendum an awakening, I argue that it is. Not only because creature
consciousness assumes an awakening, but because the language he uses to describe the feeling
implies it.
Let us consider the deepest and most fundamental element in all strong and
sincerely felt religious emotion. Faith unto salvation, trust, love – all these are
there. But over and above these is an element which may also on occasion, quite
apart from them, profoundly affect us and occupy the mind with a wellnigh
bewildering strength…we are dealing with something for which there is only one
appropriate expression, “mysterium tremendum.”44
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Mysterium tremendum is the most essential religious emotion that can be felt. An emotion that is
greater than love, trust, and belief in deliverance from sin. We are still speaking to religious
feeling, but a different feeling than creature consciousness. Where creature consciousness
manifests as an overwhelming feeling of nothingness, mysterium tremendum is the greatest
feeling of presence of the numen. Otto’s language implying mysterium tremendum as the greatest
feeling, “deepest,” “fundamental,” and “bewildering strength” is what I feel implies awakening.
Since this is such an important aspect of the holy, Otto breaks down mysterium and
tremendum separately. This attention also contribute to my argument that mysterium tremendum
is an awakening. Otto starts by explaining three different elements of tremendum: the element of
“Awefulness,” the element of “Overpoweringness,” and the element of “Energy.” Awefulness
comes out of Otto’s analysis of the root of tremendum, tremor.
Tremor is in itself merely the perfectly familiar and “natural” emotion of fear. But
here the term is taken, aptly enough but still only by analogy, to denote a quite
specific kind of emotional response, wholly distinct from that of being afraid,
though it so far resembles it that the analogy of fear may be used to throw light
upon its nature.45
Tremor is an emotion associated with fear, but for Otto it is something more; because fear is
familiar, it is a useful place to start. The tremor Otto tries to describe is both wholly other than
fear and also accessibly understood through talking about fear.
So what is this tremor that is wholly other than fear? “Of modern languages English has
the words ‘awe,’ ‘aweful,’ which in their deeper and most special sense approximate closely to
our meaning.”46 Otto uses aweful instead of awesome because of the emotion associated with
fear. The word “awesome” has positive connotations and does not speak to fear. Otto also
deliberately uses aweful instead of awful. I see this as Otto reminding us of the context, the holy.
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But what is Awe? Awe is a response to something unexpected, but also similar to
admiration or astonishment. Awe and fear feel connected in the element of surprise. When we
are afraid, it usually is due to a shocking event. If not shocking, unexpected. We cannot expect to
feel fear or awe toward something before experiencing it. Both are responses to something
outside of us, therefore outside of our control.
Another similarity between awe and fear seems to be the intrigue that surprises bring.
When talking about Awefulness Otto says, “It first begins to stir in the feeling of ‘something
uncanny,’ ‘eerie,’ or ‘weird.’”47 Mysterium tremendum begins to stir with a feeling of
unfamiliarity. Otto relates the feeling the unfamiliar stirring to the “shudder” you feel in the
hearing a ghost story: “That this is so is shown by the potent attraction again and again exercised
by the element of horror and ‘shudder’ in ghost stories, even among persons of high all-round
education.”48 This is universal. It doesn’t matter how educated you are, ghost stories will lead
you to shudder. Everyone experiences things unfamiliar to himself or herself and everyone can
be surprised.
Otto uses the example of a ghost story and the fear it creates as an analogy to get at the
idea of awe he is trying to convey. In the shudder moment of a ghost story, Otto points to the
moment that catches us off guard. I believe the exact moment of surprise that builds out of
anticipation is what Otto is trying to point to.
Another way Otto uses this analogy is our reaction to the shudder. “The awe or ‘dread’
may indeed be so overwhelmingly great that it seems to penetrate to the very marrow, making
the man’s hair bristle and his limbs quake.”49 The moment we become afraid during the telling of
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a ghost story, we have a physical reaction. We experience horripilation and may even jump out
of our seats. Awe, like the shudder, is such a deep experience that we have a physical reaction.
The reaction to the numen is what Otto has already explained as creature consciousness.
We can see how fear and awe are similar, but how is fear simply an analogy for awe? The
difference becomes clear in Otto’s examples from the Bible. Otto speaks about the wrath and
anger of God in the Old Testament. The wrath and anger of God correspond to the fear Otto is
trying to describe. God’s anger and wrath strike characters dead for things like touching the arc
of the covenant and also punishes nations of peoples for wrongdoings. This wrath and anger
portrays a God that is harsh and punishing. As if God has chosen specific people to punish.
Believing God punishes people would also assume that God rewards people. This would
invalidate Otto’s universality.
Otto’s approach to religion is universal because we are all individuals and because we all
have a priori knowledge of the holy. We have a priori knowledge of the holy because it is
objective. If God were to reward and punish individuals, God would fail to be objective. For
Otto, the divine presence’s purpose is not to reward or punish, but to simply awaken religious
emotion.
Otto suggests that we look at the anger and wrath in the Old Testament as awe-inspired
opposed to fear instilling. “‘Wrath’ here is the ‘ideogram’ of a unique emotional moment in
religious experience.”50 God is not picking people or peoples out to punish. God is revealing the
possibility of religious experience. We are not supposed to be afraid of the interactions within the
Old Testament between humans and God, we are supposed to be awe-inspired about their
existence. It’s not about a punishment or reward, but the possibility of a direct encounter with the
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divine. Such encounters are awe-filled because they awaken us to the existence of the divine.
The wrath of God becomes a symbol for the awe regarding religious experience as opposed to
fear.
As mentioned earlier, this feeling of mysterium tremendum enables creature
consciousness. The awe-inspiring shock is meant for us to recognize our nothingness in the
presence of the supreme.
It has become mystical awe, and sets free as its accompaniment, reflected in selfconsciousness, that “creature-feeling” that has already been described as the
feeling of personal nothingness and submergence before the awe-inspiring object
directly experienced.51
We can only come to realize our own nothingness in our submergence in the awe-inspiring
numen we experience. In arguing mysterium tremendum as an awakening, I view the
submergence before the awe-inspiring object as mysterium tremendum. Mysterium tremendum
enable creature consciousness. The element of awe in regards to tremor is pushing us to embrace
the presence of the divine as opposed to deny its presence. The difference between awe and fear
becomes how we view the experience. Fear leads us to become tentative about whatever it is that
evoked the fear. Awe directs us to become curious and embracing, while still being surprised.
The Awefulness of tremor is not the only element that leads to creature consciousness.
The element of Overpoweringness also plays a role. Awe simply has to do with the specific
emotion. Overpoweringness is about the intensity. For this reason, Otto is able to combine both
elements.
It will be felt at once that there is yet a further element which must be added, that,
namely, of “might,” “power,” “absolute overpoweringness.” We will take to
represent this the term majestas, majesty…The tremendum may then be rendered
more adequately tremendum majestas, or “aweful majesty.”52
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Overpoweringness is used in combination with Awefulness to refer to the concentration of
religious feeling. The numen is not just aweful. The numen is majestically aweful. Not only are
we left curious and embracing about what the numen is, we are left astounded by the vastness of
the emotion we experience.
This Overpoweringness is pointing to the one-sidedness of Schleiermacher’s
feeling of dependence brought up in explaining creature consciousness: the idea that there is
more to religious feeling than dependence. Here, Otto also uses mysticism as an example. For
Otto, both Schleiermacher and mysticism are focused on finding the reason for dependence.
Schleiermacher’s answer to dependence is God. Mysticism’s is an “annihilation of the self.”53
Where Schleiermacher says that we are dependent because our existence depends on a supreme
being, mysticism says that we are dependent because the self doesn’t exist. The problem Otto
raises with mysticism is that “there is no thought in this of any causal relation between God, the
creator, and the self, the creature.”54 Otto argues that the self exists; the presence of the numen is
just so overwhelming, we realize that in comparison to its aweful majesty, we are nothing: “in
contrast to ‘the overpowering’ of which we are conscious as an object over against the self, there
is the feeling of one’s own submergence, of being but ‘dust and ashes’ and nothingness.” 55 We
aren’t actually dust and ashes; we are washed over by the feeling of nothingness. The awe lets us
in on the amazement of the numen, and the majesty is the degree of the awe. If we do not exist,
we cannot have a relationship with God.
Mysterium tremendum is all about the relationship. Otto explains:
The point from which speculation starts is not a “consciousness of absolute
dependence”… it starts from a consciousness of the absolute superiority or
53
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supremacy of a power other than myself, and it is only as it falls back upon
ontological terms to achieve its end… that that element of tremendum, originally
apprehended as “plentitude of power”, becomes transmuted into “plentitude of
being.”56
Otto is distinguishing his religious feeling from feelings of dependence. We do not come to find
a divine presence through an absence of something within ourselves. We come to figure out the
presence of the divine through experiencing a presence outside of ourselves. The idea of a
presence is reinforced in the last aspect of the quote “plentitude of being.” Overpoweringness
suggests an intense power felt outside of us, but Otto is talking about the intense Overpowering
presence of the numen. The power is inherent within the presence. And because it is a presence
we are experiencing, the experience is relational.
What Otto is trying to establish in his idea of religious feeling is almost the inverse of
what others have described. Where others start with recognition of something lacking in the self
and come to find a divine presence as a solution for the absence, Otto starts with the divine
presence awakening the idea that we are nothing in comparison to the divine presence. A
comparison is possible because there is a relationship between the divine and creature. In Otto,
the idea that the self is less than the divine follows an experience of a divine presence. We
cannot know that we are less than or nothing until we are certain of what the divine presence is.
The divine presence is not an answer, but an experience; and I argue, an awakening.
There is one last element of tremor and that is Energy or Urgency. Otto goes back to the
example of God’s wrath in the Old Testament:
It [Energy] is particularly vividly perceptible in the ópyn or “wrath”; and it
everywhere clothes itself in symbolic expressions – vitality, passion, emotional
temper, will, force, movement, excitement, activity, impetus. These features are
typical and recur again and again.57
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What is being brought out about the numen here is that it is lively. Something that contains
passion, emotional temper, and excitement, among other things, cannot simply be a power. The
numen is a living presence. Since it is alive and free to move of its own will, we can experience it
over and over and over again. Yes, one can only be awakened once, however, that doesn’t mean
we can’t experience the feeling we have been awakened to again and again. It just means we will
be familiar with it whenever we happen to encounter it again.
Because Energy reinforces a presence, Otto uses it to directly challenge the idea of a
rational God in philosophy. Otto recognizes that some philosophers are challenging an
anthropomorphic God, but also argues against their idea that God is rational. Otto says that those
philosophers are right to shut down the idea of an anthropomorphic God, but that they are wrong
in failing to recognize the non-rational aspect of the divine.58 The element of Energy becomes a
crucial part of the non-rational aspect of the holy. It is the living feature of the numen outside of
the anthropomorphic ideal.
The last three elements we have covered, Awefulness, Overpoweringness and Energy
only cover tremendum, half of mysterium tremendum. The living, majestically aweful numen is
what has been presented thus far. Mysterium and the element of fascination are left. Mysterium
has one element: the “Wholly Other.” The element of fascination serves as an element of the
whole numinous experience.
Before beginning to elaborate upon mysterium, Otto clarifies that although elements of
tremendum may seem similar to mysterium, they are in fact different:
The elements of meaning implied in “awefulness” and “mysteriousness” are in
themselves definitely different. The latter may so far preponderate in the religious
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in religious consciousness, may stand out so vividly, that in comparison with it
the former almost sinks out of sight.59
It becomes clear that mysterium is a much deeper feeling than tremendum, or at least the
Awefulness of tremendum. To further the distinction between mysterium and tremendum, Otto
introduces the word “stupor” in juxtaposition to tremor. “Stupor is plainly a different thing from
tremor; it signifies blank wonder, an astonishment that strikes us dumb, amazement absolute.”60
Where tremor was analogous to fear, stupor is simply a dumbfounded feeling.
The idea of feeling dumbfounded begs the question, what are we dumbfounded about?
What aspect of the numen leaves us with a blank wonder? This is where the “Wholly Other”
element of mysterium is explained: “that which is ‘mysterious’ is … the ‘wholly other’, that
which is quite beyond the sphere of the usual, the intelligible, and the familiar.”61 We already
know that the numen exists outside of ourselves. This outside existence leads to a feeling that is
alien or Wholly Other. This element of the numen is outside the sphere of our own imagination.
The truly “mysterious” object is beyond our apprehension and comprehension,
not only because our knowledge has certain irremovable limits, but because in it
we come upon something inherently “wholly other,” whose kind and character are
incomprehensible with our own, and before which we therefore recoil in a wonder
that strikes a chill and numb.62
Our knowledge and experience are limited. We can only comprehend knowledge and experience
in relation to our form and intellect. Because the numen exists outside of both of these things,
there is an element that is Wholly Other.
The example Otto uses to contextualize this is a step further than a ghost story; it’s an
actual ghost. This example helps us clarify the difference between tremor and stupor. If someone
is telling a ghost story, there is only so much emotion one can evoke. Feeling like you are
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encountering a ghost gives rise to a much different emotion than a story about a ghost.
Mysterium makes sense as a more powerful feeling then tremor in this comparison.
When Otto says that the Wholly Other raises a wonder that strikes a “chill and numb,” he
is pointing at the ghost-likeness. More elaborately:
The ghost’s real attraction rather consists in this, that of itself and in an
uncommon degree it entices the imagination, awakening strong interest and
curiosity; it is the weird thing itself that allures the fancy. But it does this, not
because it is “something long and white” (as someone once defined a ghost), nor
yet through any of the positive and conceptual attributes which fancies about
ghosts have invented, but because it is a thing that “doesn’t really exist at all,” the
“wholly other,” something which has no place in our scheme of reality but
belongs to an absolutely different one, and which at the same time arouses an
irrepressible interest in the mind.63
Ghosts evoke strong reactions. When we think we see a ghost, our imaginations soar. Something
outside of reality momentarily becomes real. The emotion and imagination that arise are out of
the curiosities about whether what we have just seen was real. As Otto says, the ghost itself does
exist, just not in our reality. The experience of “seeing” a ghost raises so many questions and sets
our imaginations ablaze. Our minds struggle between reality and fantasy. The ghost becomes
intriguing and leaves us wondering.
In this analogy, the ghost is the Wholly Other. All at once the thing that doesn’t
seemingly exist appears to exist. The numen we experience outside of ourselves is so alien that
we react as if we had seen a ghost. Just the same as the ghost, the numen exists, but it exists in a
different reality.
It cannot be ignored that, like ghost stories, ghosts arouse fear. Otto addresses this with
the element of fascination. Before expanding upon the element of fascination, we should gain an
understanding of where this element fits into the numinous experience. By numinous experience,
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I am taking Otto to mean our encounter with the numen, so just mysterium tremendum. He is not
speaking to the reaction of the experience, creature consciousness, but solely the experience.
Otto dedicates an entire chapter to the element of fascination. At the start of the chapter,
he situates the element:
The qualitative content of the numinous experience, to which “the mysterious”
stands as form, is in one of its aspects the element of daunting “awefulness” and
“majesty,” which has already been dealt with in detail; but it is clear that it has at
the same time another aspect, in which it shows itself as something uniquely
attractive and fascinating.64
The form of the numinous experience lies in the mysterium. The numinous is Wholly Other. The
content and quality of that form is brought to life by two things, the tremendum’s elements of
Awefulness and Overpoweringness and the element of fascination. Now we know that the
element of fascination couples with tremendum to make up the quality of the numinous
experience.
In order to come to an understanding of the element of fascination Otto talks about this
pairing that makes up the numinous experience’s content:
These two qualities, the daunting and the fascinating, now combine in a strange
harmony of contrasts, and the resultant dual character of the numinous
consciousness, to which the entire religious development bears witness, at any
rate from the level of “deamonic dread” onwards, is at once the strangest and
most noteworthy phenomenon in the whole history of religion.65
The elements from tremendum make up the daunting Otto speaks of. In talking about the
daunting and the fascinating together, Otto is recognizing their differences. On the one hand,
daunting is made up of feelings of Awefulness and Overpoweringness. The Aweful-Majesty
evokes unexpected, overwhelming feelings. On the other hand, the fascination draws upon our
curiosity. In one sense we cannot comprehend what it is we have experienced and on the other
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we are totally intrigued by the feeling. This seems less like one/other and more like a both/and.
Together, Otto names this “dual character of the numinous” a “form of ‘deamonic dread. It
seems as though it is this specific aspect of mysterium tremendum that allows Otto to claim it as
the “the deepest and most fundamental element in all strong and sincerely felt religious
emotion.”66
“Deamonic dread” is the combining of the daunting and the fascinating, but what is it
really? Here, the fear that was set aside in regard to the ghostliness of Wholly Other arises.
The deamonic-divine object may appear to the mind as an object of horror and
dread, but at the same time it is no less something that allures with a potent
charm, and the creature, who trembles before it, utterly cowed and cast down, has
always at the same time the impulse to turn to it, nay even to make it somehow his
own. The “mystery” is for him not merely something to be wondered at but
something that entrances him.67
The fear of ghosts, or, in this case, the horror and dread of the deamonic-divine/numen, appear in
the mind. We have already discussed at length earlier that the Awefulness of tremendum is only
analogous to fear. So fear is to ghosts as Awefulness is to the numen. However, we are not just
afraid of ghosts or the numinous. We, the creatures who tremble before the numen,
simultaneously turn towards the numen. The very thing that evokes a “fear” is the thing is the
same thing that “entrances” us. Therefore, the “deamonic dread” exists as a seemingly
contradictory feeling. However, what I think Otto is trying to get at is that we wouldn’t be
fascinated if we weren’t also daunted. The strong feelings we experience also ignite a
fascination.
Otto calls the element of fascination “the Dionysiac-element in the numen.”68 There is
more to fascination than the word implies. In referring to the Greek goddess Dionysus, Otto is
66
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pointing to an aspect of pleasure. There is something about the numinous that leaves us wanting
more. Can we pinpoint what it is about the experience that leaves us both satisfied and
dissatisfied at the same time?
Part of the reason the numinous experience is both satisfying and dissatisfying is that the
feelings that arise can only occur through experience: “it can only be firmly grasped, thoroughly
understood, and profoundly appreciated, purely in, with, and from the feeling itself.” 69 After
encountering the numen, we feel the greatest emotion known to religion. But it’s not only
feelings that we gain, it’s an understanding of the numen that is clear within the experience. The
feelings and understanding of the numen are ephemeral. This is what makes experiencing the
numen both satisfying and dissatisfying. In one second it is incredibly stimulating and in the
next, it’s gone. Like any type of pleasure, I’m sure there is a rising and falling of feeling and
understanding. The problem is that the only way to access the emotion and understanding in its
purest and strongest form is by experiencing it, mysterium tremendum, again. This points to the
subjectiveness and the self of the holy that will be addressed later on.
One last thing Otto points out about fascination is that it becomes an initiator of an
endless cycle. “Possession of and by the numen becomes an end in itself; it begins to be sought
for its own sake.”70 Once we experience the numen, the experience becomes desired again and
again. The experience is the end that is continually sought. But what begins the cycle? What
Otto doesn’t talk about is how it all begins. Here I embellish my argument that mysterium
tremendum is an awakening.
We can only begin to desire the numen if we have had the numinous experience, because
the numinous experience awakens our a priori knowledge of the holy. We know that the a priori
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knowledge of the holy must be awoken from Otto’s statement, “as everything that comes ‘of the
spirit’ must be awakened.”71
One could argue that an a priori knowledge is innate and cannot require an awakening
because it is just there. But just because something is innate does not mean we know what
exactly it is. Think of it as if we were all inherently colorblind with the a priori knowledge of all
color.72 If we were colorblind, what would color be? Being colorblind doesn’t limit us from
seeing color altogether, but limits the range. Being unaware of our limited definition of color
leads us to lack the pure experience and understanding of color. This is the same with the a
priori knowledge of the holy. We have the ability to perceive numinous feelings, but it doesn’t
necessarily mean we know the holy. The mysterium tremendum in the color analogy would be an
experience of briefly experiencing all color. Until we see color, we will not ever know what
color truly is. Until we experience mysterium tremendum, we cannot truly know what the holy is.
Being awoken to the full experience of the holy also means that creature consciousness is
not accessible until after we have experienced mysterium tremendum. We cannot truly know
what we are missing until we have experienced the fullness of what exists. Just as we do not
truly know what color is until we have seen it, the opposite is also true. We do not fully
understand our colorblindness until we have seen color. So, we cannot fully comprehend our
nothingness until we have experienced the numen’s aweful majesty. This point also clarifies
what is meant by nothingness. We aren’t literally nothing. We just exist as something so much
less than the holy. As colorblind people, we don’t see in black and white, we just don’t
experience color in its fullness.
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Just as it has been shown that creature consciousness precedes mysterium tremendum, I
want to now speak to the rational aspect of the holy preceding mysterium tremendum. Otto says
the rational is predicated upon the non-rational. “For so far are these ‘rational’ attributes from
exhausting the idea of deity, that they in fact imply a non-rational supra-natural subject of which
they are predicates.”73 Otto says the rational succeeds the non-rational, but classifies them both
as a priori. If the rational succeeds the non-rational, can the rational be a priori? If creature
consciousness is a reaction to mysterium tremendum, can it even be considered a priori? If we
awaken to the feeling of the numen, what is it that is a priori?
In Otto’s line of thinking, a priori incorporates reaction. Otto declares that creature
consciousness and the rational follow mysterium tremendum. To clarify, mysterium tremendum is
simply all the feelings that arise in the presence of the numen. Creature consciousness, the
awareness of our nothingness, and the rational, the knowledge of the deity’s attributes, follow.
This means that not only is the feeling of the numen instinctual, but the reactions to those
feelings are also imbedded within us. We know this to be true because Otto’s holy is classified
as a priori. That applies the rational and non-rational equally.
In arguing mysterium tremendum as an awakening, I am simultaneously challenging
Otto’s definition of a priori. If a priori is an inherent knowledge, how can a reaction be
considered a priori? Something that is inherent cannot also be reactive. It would mean that what
is a priori is simultaneously a posteriori, especially because we are strictly speaking about
knowledge. The knowledge gained from mysterium tremendum enables the knowledge of
creature consciousness.
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Setting aside the problems that may arise from a dichotomy, we can see that Otto’s idea
of a priori contradicts his idea of subjectivity. Otto’s idea of subjectivity is not spoken to as a big
idea by Otto, but is an important idea within his work. Otto’s idea of subjectivity is that we all
come to know the numen in the ways of our own mind: “He must be guided and led on by
consideration and discussion of the matter through the ways of his own mind.”74 What is
subjective are the ways we come to know the numen.75 We must all come to find the numen in
individual ways. Coming to find the numen in individual ways assumes we are individuals.
Although we are individuals and come to find the numen subjectively, the numen itself is
objective. We all end up at the same thing, the numen. The ways in which we get there are all
completely different. This idea will be elaborated upon in Chapter 2, but I’m bringing it up now
to say that this idea contradicts his definition of a priori. Otto’s idea of a priori includes
objective reaction to the numen. If we come to find the numen and ultimately the holy
subjectively, it means that we all have a different relationship to the holy. The holy in and of
itself exists as one thing, but we each relate to that one thing in our own way. This is true of
human relations. We are one person, but have many different relationships with many different
people. I see Otto assuming we all have the same relationship with the holy by incorporating
reactive knowledge in his idea of a priori.
Assuming we are all going to react and come to the same conclusions about the holy
after encountering mysterium tremendum is assuming that we all have the same relationship with
the holy. Otto knows that this isn’t true. In fact, his idea of the holy is fundamentally rooted in
his idea of subjectiveness. It seems crucial to distinguish between the holy and our relationship to

74

Otto, The Idea of the Holy, 7.
The ways in which we come to the numen do not have to be “religious.” One example Otto
eventually gives is music. This will be elaborated upon in Chapter 3.
75

36
the holy. The holy is objective. It is an objective thing we come to understand subjectively. This
subjective way of understanding does not allow for the existence of a model relationship with the
holy. Just because the holy is objective does not mean its relationships are also objective.
I have argued that Otto’s definition of a priori, incorporating reactive knowledge,
contradicts his own idea of subjectiveness. If I have been successful, it means that the argument
contingent upon it can be made: that mysterium tremendum is the awakening of a priori
knowledge and that creature consciousness and the rational aspect of the holy are not a priori.
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Chapter 2- The Passive Soul: Relocating Individuality
We have examined the a priori view of the holy and the rational and non-rational aspects,
but there are still a few facets of Otto’s approach to theorizing religion that have yet to be
elaborated. Many of the ideas set aside for further discussion in chapter 1 involve Otto’s idea of
self and will be explored here. The goal of this chapter is to establish and problematize Otto’s
dichotomy of the self, spirit and soul. I will argue against the necessity of the soul through an
inconsistency between Otto’s definition of individuality and Otto’s definition of soul. This
chapter also aims to connect spirit and soul with rational and non-rational.
From what we have already discussed, we know that Otto’s self is a creature and has a
mind. In chapter 1, I clarified that Otto isn’t talking about the senses when he uses the word
feelings: “these feelings can only arise in the mind as accompanying emotions when the category
of ‘the numinous’ is called into play.”76 The feelings, such as “creature consciousness” and
mysterium tremendum, which inform us of the numinous’s presence, arise in the mind. By “us,” I
mean creatures. In Otto’s approach to theorizing religion, we are creatures. This was established
in his definition of “creature consciousness”: “It is the emotion of a creature, submerged and
overwhelmed by its own nothingness in contrast to that which is supreme above all creatures.”77
Feelings such as “creature consciousness” that arise in the mind arise in the mind of creatures.
All of this is very vague. The creature could exist as the mind. The creature could exist as
something else and have a mind. We are urged away from thinking about the self as a body,
although we have not really been given an alternative. From what I have explained thus far, the
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self is a creature that is able to perceive feelings through a mind. What that mind is to the
creature has yet to be disclosed, not to mention what the creature consists of.
In appendix IV of The Idea of the Holy, Otto gives a brief explanation of the self: “Now
what is true of our apprehension of the divine is true also of its counterpart in the creature – soul
and spirit.”78 By “apprehension of the divine,” Otto means the rational and non-rational aspects
of the holy. He has just gotten done summarizing all we have already discussed, that the rational
and non-rational exist together as the holy. He is pushing this further to explain that we, the
creatures, are microcosms of the holy. More specifically, we are interested in regarding the
microcosm as what the rational and non-rational are within the creature. The rational and nonrational features of the holy become spirit and soul for the creature. The self as a microcosm of
the holy will be elaborated on toward the conclusion of this chapter and further in chapter 3.
In order to make sense of what the mind is in relation to the self, we must address what
spirit and soul are. Otto does not elaborate upon what he means by spirit and soul in appendix
IV. In the whole of The Idea of the Holy, the only other time Otto mentions spirit and soul in this
context is in appendix V. Spirit is mentioned in the last page before the appendix, however. It is
capitalized and I take it to refer to the Holy Spirit. Outside of the creature context, Otto reveals a
different meaning of spirit and soul when he speaks to the ghost-like creatures we refer to when
trying to explain phenomena. Now, I look to Naturalism and Religion for an explanation of the
intricacies of self. For it is there where Otto has clarified its definition and distinction.
Before elaborating upon soul and spirit, it is important to note that Otto comes to define
and expand upon them near the end of Naturalism and Religion. Otto spends the majority of the
book presenting different theories of naturalism and arguing their failure to incorporate religion.
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Soul and spirit come out of the relationship between naturalism and religion Otto established
many pages earlier. Because of this, the established relationship between naturalism and religion
will be used to help guide our understanding of soul and spirit, and, therefore, also mind and
body.
Otto defines soul and spirit in chapter XI, “Freedom of Spirit.” Soul is explained first
within the section “Individuality.”
It is true that the ‘soul’ does not spring up ready-made in the developing body,
lying dormant in it, and only requiring to waken up gradually. It really becomes.
But the becoming is a self-realisation. It is not true that it is put together and built
up bit by bit by experience, so that a different being might develop if the
experiences were different…A man may turn out very different according to
circumstances, education, influences. But he would nevertheless recognise
‘himself’ under any circumstances. He will never become anything of which he
had not the possibility within him from the very beginning, any more than the
rose will become a violet if it is nurtured with a different kind of manure.79
The soul is something that is established through our experiences. We can never become
something other than our soul. The analogy of the rose is very helpful. No matter how you care
for a rose, it will never turn into a different flower. A rose may get different amounts of sunlight
and water, but at no point will it fail to be a rose. The rose’s experience does not alter the fact
that it is a rose. Even if it doesn’t fully bloom, it is still a rose.
If we alter the rose analogy, we can use it to make sense of how Otto views the body. In
creating a second slightly different analogy than Otto’s, I am not only introducing Otto’s view of
the body, but also trying to steer us away from thinking of the soul in a tangible way. Otto uses
the analogy to help us think about what the soul is, but I feel that it is important to distinguish the
difference between body and soul. Otto’s view on the body will be expanded upon later.
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Otto has many problems with the body, one of which involves individuality. This is
exposed in chapter V, “Religion and Theory of Descent,” of Naturalism and Religion when Otto
is addressing the issue with descent.
The most oppressive corollary of the doctrine of descent is undoubtedly that
through it the human race seems to become lost in the infra-human, from which it
cannot be separated by any hard and fast boundaries, or absolute lines of
demarcation.80
Otto’s argument against bodies is the unity of the human race. Because we are all human, we are
not individuals. We are lesser than human because we are a collective group. In Otto’s rose
analogy, all of our souls are different flowers. The essence of the soul is not its embodiment; it is
our predetermined individuality.
For the sake of explaining Otto’s view of the body, consider a rosebush instead of a
single rose. Also, instead of the roses being soul, think of them now as bodies. If we are seeing
the roses as bodies, their individuality escapes the tangible essence of the rose. If our bodies are
roses, our souls are not our rose nature, but an internal predetermined individuality.
If we go back to the first chapter’s discussion about subjectivity, this idea of individuality
is wound up in that idea. Otto’s idea of subjectivity in relation to the holy is that we, individual
creatures, awaken to the holy “in the ways of his [our] own mind.”81 Individuality is important to
Otto’s self in relation to the holy because it is a creature’s individuality that enables it to
establish a relationship with the holy. We are only able to be subjective, have ways of our own
mind, because we are all different. Otto’s idea of the holy doesn’t make sense unless the creature
is an individual.
If Otto does not see the body within the scope of individuality, what is a creature’s
essence? Is it the mind? Isn’t the mind part of the body? In the quote earlier defining soul, Otto
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said that a soul “really becomes.” “Become” is a key verb for Otto. It is contrasted with being.
Being and becoming are distinguished in the second chapter of Naturalism and Religion entitled
“Naturalism.”
Being and Becoming include two great realms: that of “Nature” and that of
“Mind,” i.e. consciousness and the processes of consciousness. And two
apparently fundamentally different branches of knowledge relate to these: the
natural sciences, and the mental sciences.82
Being is connected to nature and consciousness and becoming connected to the mind and the
process of consciousness. In the original quote given to define soul, Otto says, “the ‘soul’ does
not spring up ready-made in the developing body,”83 so we know that the body is not the soul’s
essence because of its lack of individuality.
In order to come to an understanding about what Otto’s view of the essence of the self is
in relation to being and becoming and the mind, we must understand how Otto defines
naturalism and religion. Naturalism is most simply defined by Otto when he describes its main
goals: “Naturalism is proud of the fact that it desires nothing more than to search after truth.”84
From this we can comprehend that naturalism aims to explain things and classify them as truths.
But what are the “things” naturalism is trying to explain and classify as truth? “The fundamental
convictions of naturalism, its general tendencies, and the points of view which determine its
outlook, are primarily related to that order of facts which forms the subject of the natural
sciences, to ‘Nature.’”85 The “things” naturalism seeks to claim invoke nature and natural
science, plants, animals, astrology, etc, just as the name suggests.
In turning to Otto’s definition of religion, we can see its opposition to naturalism: “For
this is the most real characteristic of religion; it seeks depth in things, reaches out towards what
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is concealed, uncomprehended, and mysterious. It is more than humility; it is piety. And piety is
experience of mystery.”86 Religion seeks depth and relishes mystery. Otto goes as far as saying
that religion is piety and then defines piety as the “experience of mystery.” Religion becomes
defined, indirectly, as the experience of mystery. There is a question that arises in religions
opposing definition to naturalism: what is truth in the context of mystery? I am noting naturalism
and religion’s opposing definition, but will address it in chapter 3.
Since we understand what Otto means by naturalism and religion, we can use his
distinction between religious creatures and natural animals to localize the mind and introduce the
spirit.
We get the distinction between human and animal in the section in chapter XI of
Naturalism and Religion entitled “Mind and Spirit. The Human and the Animal Soul.”
What is the relation between the human and the animal mind? This has always
been a vital question in the conflict between naturalism and the religious outlook.
And as in the whole problem of the psychical so here the interest on both sides
has been mainly concentrated on the question of “mortality” or “immortality.”
Man is immortal because he has a soul. Animals “have no souls.” “Animals also
have souls, differing only in degree but not in substantial nature from the soul of
man: as they are mortal, man must be so too.” “Animals have minds: the merely
psychical passes away with the body. But man has spirit in addition. It is
imperishable.” These and many other assertions were made on one side or the
other. And both sides made precisely the same mistake: they made the belief in
the immortality of our true nature dependent upon a proof that the soul has a
physical “substantial nature,” which is to be regarded as an indestructible
substance, a kind of spiritual atom. And on the other hand they overlooked the
gist of the whole matter, the true starting-point, which cannot be overlooked if the
religious outlook is not to be brought into discredit.87
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Otto quotes a “conversation” between naturalism and religion about the difference between
animals and humans.88 The conversation points to the difficulty in distinguishing the difference
between the two. What religion is arguing for the human, naturalism is also arguing about the
animal. The argument is seemingly impossible, however Otto approaches it through a flaw both
contain. Their flaw: “they made the belief in the immortality of our true nature dependent upon a
proof that the soul has a physical ‘substantial nature,’ which is to be regarded as an indestructible
substance.”89 Their flaw lies within the belief that the soul has a physical essence.
This flaw advances Otto’s argument about the body we discussed earlier regarding
descent. We previously arrived at how humans can’t be embodied because the human race leaves
no room for individuality. Here, not only are bodies universal within the human race, animals
also share embodiment, even if in a different form. For Otto, embodiment is part of nature.
After establishing Otto views bodies as part of nature, the question of essence and
localization emerge. What are creatures if not embodied? Although he doesn’t address the
localization, Otto proposes an alternative essence.
It is undoubtedly a fundamental postulate, and one which the religious outlook
cannot give up, that the human spirit is more than all creatures, and is in quite a
different order from stars, plants, and animals. But absolutely the first necessity
from the point of view of the religious outlook is to establish the incomparable
value of the human spirit; the question of its “substantial nature” is in itself a
matter of entire indifference. The religious outlook observes that man can will
good and can pray, and no other creature can do this. And it sees that this makes
the difference between two worlds. Whether the bodily and mental physics in
both these worlds is the same or different, is to it a matter rather of curiosity than
of importance.90

The terms “spirit” and “soul” are thrown around within that conversation, but we mustn’t look
too far into their meaning there because Otto deconstructs the conversation to say that both sides
have been assuming both animals and humans are embodied creatures.
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He claims that we are spirit.91 Because humans/creatures have a spirit, they are above all other
embodied creatures. It is not our body, but our spirit that make us religious beings. “It is
undoubtedly a fundamental postulate, and one which the religious outlook cannot give up, that
the human spirit is more than all creatures, and is in quite a different order from stars, plants, and
animals.”92 What sets humans apart as religious is their spirit.
Otto also establishes that the spirit is an unquestionable element of religion: “But
absolutely the first necessity from the point of view of the religious outlook is to establish the
incomparable value of the human spirit”93 What makes everything else not religious and
therefore part of nature, is their lack of a spirit. Without a spirit, everything else is incomparable.
What exactly does that make the human spirit? “The religious outlook observes that man
can will good and can pray, and no other creature can do this.” 94 What makes humans religious,
obtainers of spirit is an ability no other embodied being has. Humans can “pray and will good.”
More than that, Otto later goes on to distinguish the difference between training and educating.
He says, “I can train a young ape or an elephant, can teach it to open wine-bottles and perform
tricks. But I can educate the child of the savage.”95 Animals can be taught how to perform
repeated actions. Humans, on the other hand, can be taught, educated and apply what they have
learned elsewhere. Humans are able to perform tasks from their individual knowledge. The spirit
becomes defined as ability.
In the quote regarding human and animal distinction, Otto uses the term “creature,” however;
we must remember that this quote is from Naturalism and Religion. The meaning of creature
within the context “that the human spirit is more than all creatures,” is not the same creature
from Otto’s Idea of the Holy. What creature means here is all other embodied beings, animals,
plants and even stars. The human spirit here is the same as the creature’s spirit in regards to the
idea of the holy. Otto’s human in Naturalism and Religion is his creature in The Idea of the Holy.
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The only thing enabling our ability seems to be the divine. “Whether the bodily and
mental physics in both these worlds is the same or different, is to it a matter rather of curiosity
than of importance”96 The two worlds are the animal and the human. Otto is saying here that it
doesn’t matter what the body or mind is, all that matters is that a spirit exists. Otto is failing to
localize the spirit here, however, we will come to understand how he localizes the spirit in
chapter 3.
In coming to understand what Otto means when he says nature through body and spirit,
we can apply it to the discussion of being and becoming, which is ultimately the discussion of
the soul. Looking back, being and becoming were connected with nature and mind. Since we
now know that Otto views the body as part of nature we can view being and becoming as mind
and body.
Knowing this, we can make sense of the soul’s definition: “It [the soul] really
becomes.”97 Looking back at the quote about being and becoming, we can locate the soul.
Being and Becoming include two great realms: that of ‘Nature’ and that of
‘Mind,’ i.e. consciousness and the processes of consciousness. And two
apparently fundamentally different branches of knowledge relate to these: the
natural sciences, and the mental sciences.98
If the soul becomes, it is within the realm of the mind, which also connects it with the process of
consciousness and mental sciences. It is clear that the soul is associated with the mind. Whether
the soul is within or of the mind makes no difference. If the soul is associated with the mind, we
can say that it is localized there because we know we will find the soul where we find the mind.
We already clarified that the soul is a predetermined individuality and that spirit is a sort
of ability. Here, Otto distinguishes spirit and soul:
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And in the development of the mental content the “soul” itself is merely the stage
upon which all that is acquired through the senses crowds, and jostles, and unites
to form images, perceptions, and precepts. But it is itself purely passive, and it
becomes what happens to it. Therefore it is not really spirit at all, for spirit implies
spontaneity, activity, and autonomy. 99
This established separation brings me back to how the self is a microcosm of the holy in that soul
and spirit translate to rational and non-rational. In the quote above, Otto says the soul is passive,
“it [the soul] is itself purely passive.” The soul’s passivity leads it to “become what happens to
it.” We know that the soul is connected to the mind, so Otto is also saying the mind is passive.
This passivity of soul and mind mean they are dependent upon action. How do mind and soul
experience anything if they are passive? They cannot exist alone. Otto answers this in regard to
soul in saying the spirit implies activity. However, Otto fails to address what this means in
relation to the mind because he has not clearly localized the spirit.
Just as I redefined the a priori last chapter to exclude the rational, here I want to redefine
the self to exclude soul. Specifically, I want to argue that the soul is not what makes creatures
individuals. Otto defined the soul as both individual and as passive. If the soul is passive, always
receiving action, how can it be consistent as an individual? Something that depends on another
thing in order to exist cannot be an individual. The soul is dependent upon the independent spirit.
It passively awaits the ability of the spirit.
Since I have already argued that individuality is crucial to Otto’s idea of subjectivity, I’m
not arguing that the self is not an individual. What I am arguing is that the spirit is what makes
the self an individual. Something that is dependent relies on the individuality of the thing it is
dependent upon in order to become. Think of it in relation to clothes trends. Say the latest trend
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is to wear Doc Martens shoes.100 Buying Doc Martens because they are trendy is very different
from buying Doc Martens because you really love how they look and wear. Buying Doc Martens
because they are trendy is an action dependent upon someone else’s opinion and/or action. I am
arguing that we fail to be individuals when we act in this manner. We literally buy into a
collective image when we buy name-brand clothes.
Conversely, if we buy Doc Martens because we love how they look, feel they are really
comfortable, and fit into our overall image, we are acting individually. This becomes an act of
self-investment. I’m not saying everyone who wears Doc Martens or name-brand clothing fails
to be an individual. The name brands had to have started from an individual or many individuals’
love of the popular item. The point is the question, what drives us to act? That passive waiting
for something outside of ourselves makes us dependent and therefore less of an individual. That
taking action from a place of relating to and really enjoying something is direct and individual.
Through this analogy I am trying to say that the soul is wearing Doc Martens because the
spirit started a trend. Something that is independent does not need anything to make a decision.
The spirit does not need the soul. The spirit is the trendsetter, the one who is wearing Doc
Martens because they fit into who/what the spirit is. The spirit consistently acts individually,
while the soul waits in order to buy into exactly what the spirit has deemed worth buying into.
Where does religion play into this analogy? In order to answer this, I want to point back
to and elaborate on the discussion about individuality’s connection to subjectivity. We said
earlier that creatures must be individuals in order to move subjectively. We know this because
the creature’s ability to be subjective enables it to come to the numen. Arguing the spirit as
individual further connects individuality and subjectivity. Otto said, “The first necessity from the
100
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point of view of the religious outlook is to establish the incomparable value of the human
spirit.”101 Otto is saying that it is a necessity for religion to establish the human spirit. Not only
was this not claimed about the soul, but also with spirit now inclusive to individuality, it aligns
with his view of the significance of subjectivity. If we restrict the creature self to an individual
spirit, we are not restricting it at all. We, creatures, are still able to come to the numen in
subjective ways.
The existence of the soul is yet another flaw of a dichotomy, which I will come to explain
as stressing the rational in chapter 3. For now, I will leave my argument alone as simply a
deconstruction of why the soul does not belong in the religious realm. chapter 3’s discussion
addresses the cause of these rational stresses, which keep emerging.
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Chapter 3 – The Mechanized Body: Establishing Naturalism
We discussed in chapter 2 how soul and spirit connect to rational and non-rational in The
Idea of the Holy and that in both, there is an unnecessary stress on one side of the dichotomy.
Also in both, we saw how the stress was problematic. In this chapter, after showing that Otto
localizes the self in the mind, I will argue that Otto’s inconsistent use of naturalism raises issue
with the localization of the mind. This argument becomes one for the localization of the body.
Since the dichotomy body and mind is the localization of the dichotomy soul and spirit,
much of the body and mind dichotomy has already been introduced. Likewise, soul and spirit
will be used to inform body and mind. In order to explain Otto’s body and mind dichotomy, we
must work within his parameters. For the time being, when I refer to the self, although I treated it
in chapter 2, I am speaking to Otto’s untreated self.
It was established in chapter 2 that the soul, defined by Otto as predetermined
individuality, is localized in the mind. We established this through its connection to becoming.
Although ambiguous, spirit was addressed in Otto’s distinction between humans and animals.
The spirit’s localization is inconclusive because Otto defines it outside of localization. I cannot
claim Otto is localizing the self in the body or mind from what we have already discussed
because the two aspects of the self don’t align. Otto’s localized self will be clearer after we
address the inconclusive localization of the spirit.
The block quote defining spirit, which also distinguished animals and humans, concerns
Otto’s ambiguous location of the spirit.
The religious outlook observes that man can will good and can pray, and no other
creature can do this. And it sees that this makes the difference between two
worlds. Whether the bodily and mental physics in both these worlds is the same or
different, is to it a matter rather of curiosity than of importance.102
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Again, Otto is saying here that it doesn’t matter what the body or mind is, all that matters is that
a spirit exists. As we discussed, Otto views the spirit as ability. If the spirit is ability, what is it
that is able? Is the spirit both ability and the thing that is able? If the spirit is separate from the
mind, does the self exist as two separate things? If this were the case we would fail to be a self.
We would consist of selves.
Ultimately, we are speaking to the Idea of the Holy. We are trying to figure out how the
self, within the idea of holy, is localized through Naturalism and Religion. Otto wrote
Naturalism and Religion before The Idea of the Holy. This means that the self in the Idea of the
Holy, although scarcely addressed, is more developed. For all of these reasons, I turn to The Idea
of the Holy to answer the ambiguity of spirit’s localization.
In The Idea of the Holy Otto consistently refers to the mind as it relates to self. In fact, it
is one of the only, if not the only, other words Otto uses besides creature to refer to the self. The
consistent language of the mind in The Idea of the Holy coupled with Otto’s indistinct location of
spirit leads us to assume Otto localizes the self, spirit and soul, in the mind. Above all, we know
that Otto’s spirit is not of the body and nothing outside of the mind has been proposed, so the
mind is a safe assumption. Even if we were to leave Otto’s self ambiguously localized, it would
not distract from my argument.
If Otto localizes the self in the mind, or if it remains ambiguous, what does he think about
the body? Why doesn’t he include the body? Chapter 2 addressed one reason Otto has with the
body and that is individuality. The collective human race, the idea that we all have the same
body, does not bode well with Otto’s idea of individuality. This is not the only problem Otto has
with bodies. The other problem Otto has with bodies relates to naturalism. In order to understand
it, we must understand how Otto relates naturalism and religion.
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It was established that Otto defines naturalism as the explaining of nature and religion as
the experience of mystery; and that these definitions oppose each other. Before we concentrate
on how Otto establishes naturalism and religion’s relationship, his specific issues with naturalism
must be addressed.
For Otto, naturalism does not incorporate religion because it reduces nature. “Religion
comes into contact with naturalism and demands to be reconciled with it, not merely at its
periphery, but at its very core, namely, with its characteristic ideal of a mathematical-mechanical
interpretation of the whole world.”103 The problem with naturalism is that it leaves no room for
questions, mystery, and phenomenon. It leaves no room for religion. Everything about the world,
from the point of view of naturalism, is mechanized. Everything that is unknown in religion has
an explanation in naturalism. A question that then arises is: what is truth in the context of
mystery? The only thing that can be true in religion is the mystery.
Outside of naturalism’s exclusion of mystery, Otto argues that naturalism’s reduction of
nature makes it independent. This is an issue because “The ‘dependence’ of all things is the
second requirement of religion.”104 Otto is referring to Schleiermacher’s feeling of dependence
when he says “dependence.” As we discussed last chapter, it is the feeling of dependence upon
God.105 Religion is contingent upon a divine other. Naturalism’s independence leads Otto to
question it. If naturalism had answers, it should be able to address his questions. Otto questions
and questions and questions naturalism until he reaches the eschatological question: “How, from
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all this homogeneity and unity of the ultimate particles and forces, can we account for the
beginnings of the diversity which is so marked a characteristic of this world?”106 Otto is
questioning how nature created itself. Even if naturalism has an answer, Otto poses other
questions about the creation of space and time, arguing that religion challenges them as concepts.
His point is, that by reducing nature to cause and effect explanations, big questions are getting
postponed and, therefore, never truly get addressed.
The reductionist tendencies of naturalism leave no room for religion, so how does Otto
incorporate it into religion? In order to incorporate naturalism into religion, Otto has to redefine
naturalism. “Even the world, which has been brought under the reign of scientific laws, is a
mystery; it has been formulated, but not explained.”107 Otto chooses to view naturalism’s truths
as laws. The difference between law and truth is a difference between formulating and
explaining. Explaining is stating a cause. Formulating is proposing an idea. It is also clear if we
say explaining is to solution as formulating is to strategy. Strategy and formula leave room for
religion because they do not reduce nature to cause and effects. We have already established that
explaining, which is reducing, does not coincide with religion.
In turning naturalism’s truth into laws, Otto is simultaneously making room for mystery
and disposing of reductionism. Otto is able to make the claim, “If religion is true, nature must be
of God, and it must bear tokens which allow us to interpret it as of God.”108 The relationship of
naturalism and religion becomes one of God.
If we turn back to Otto’s view of the body, we can see his problem with it, in relation to
naturalism, in a counter argument.
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Even if we admit that it [religious experience] can only become actual and
develop as an accompaniment of processes within bodies, and only within those
bodies we call “living,” and that wherever bodies exist psychical phenomena
occur; even if we were able, as we never shall be able, to produce living beings
artificially in a retort, and even if psychical phenomena occurred in these also, we
should still have made no progress towards explaining what the psychical really
is.109
Otto poses the idea of replicating bodies. If something can be replicated, we know exactly how it
came about and know exactly what we need to recreate it. I am envisioning an assembly like
workers putting together robots. Concisely, something that can be replicated is something that
can be explained. Lest we forget, in chapter 2, we established that bodies are included in the
realm of the natural. So, something that can be explained is something that is naturalistic. Otto’s
second opposition to the body is a naturalistic opposition. That it is outside of mystery.
Otto’s arguments against the body are that the human race deprives us of individuality
and that the body is naturalistic. I am going to argue that Otto’s self is really meant to be
localizes in the body. I will start with the argument against the naturalistic approach.
The problem with Otto stating the body is naturalistic is that he is assuming we know
everything about the body. Otto addresses this argument himself in the relationship we described
between religion and naturalism, but he is failing to apply it to the localization of the self.
Viewing naturalism as laws opposed to truths allows nature to exist as religious. Seeing the body
as not completely known would make it within the religious. I see Otto pointing to this but not
being able to express it. He gets at this when he claims bodies cannot be replicated just after he
claims that they can. The body is being mechanized and naturalism is being pushed back to its
previous definition of reduction that Otto has already treated.
Otto’s problem with individuality, that the human race does not allow us to be
individuals, relates back to Otto’s idea in chapter 2 that creatures are microcosms of the holy. We
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have already established that creatures are microcosms because soul and spirit mirror rational
and non-rational. The terms microcosm and macrocosm imply both difference and similarity. If,
for Otto, creatures are the mind, I mean his non-physical mind, the question arises: what is the
difference between the microcosm and the macrocosm? How could we delineate between
microcosm and macrocosm if their essence was not established? We must be embodied being in
order to distinguish ourselves as other.
If I argue this, the question becomes, how do you distinguish individuality between
creatures? Otto has already dealt with this through his idea of subjectivity. Creatures are
subjective in the ways they come to find the numen, in the “ways of their own mind.” In the
treated version, “in the ways of our own bodies.” Because we have changed the self to be body
instead of mind, the subjectivity is not on how we perceive feelings emotionally, but bodily. Otto
defines this in the Idea of the Holy through what he says about music. “Musical feeling is rather
(like numinious feeilng) something ‘wholly other,’ which, while it affords analogies and here
and there will run parallel to the ordinary emotions of life, cannot be made to coincide with them
by detailed point-to point correspondence.”110 Music is more than just a feeling. Music that really
speaks to someone evokes an emotion that is Wholly Other.
As we discussed in chapter 1, the Wholly Other is one of the deepest religious emotions
one can feel. What helps us understand the subjectivemenss of bodies through the Wholly Other
feeling evoked by music is its ability to corresponds to memories. The specific example I’m
thinking of is dementia patients who have trouble connecting with the world. It has been shown
that if you find the right music to play, a song that may have correlated with a certain memory or
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emotion, their demeanor immediately changes. Bodies that remember feelings from other
feelings, vibrations of music, how can we ever come to understand that?
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Conclusion
In this project, we have looked at Otto’s rational and non-rational, soul and spirit and
body and mind dichotomies. The mind proved problematic from Otto’s inconsistent use of
naturalism, the soul was an issue regarding individuality, and the rational didn’t seem to match
up with a priori. Otto’s treated idea of the holy then consists of an a priori non-rational, the
individual spirit and divine filled body.
If the numen is non-rational and manifests as a divine presence, which evokes feeling,
and the creature is an embodied spirit, which perceives feeling, what does that make the holy? I
guess that makes the holy a relationship between creature and numen, but we’ve already proven
the mystery cannot be defined. That’s what is so amazing about Otto, that every embodied
creature has the ability to experience something divine and we have absolutely no idea what
exactly that means.
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